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Abstract
Various adversarial audio attacks have recently been developed
to fool automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems. We here
propose a defense against such attacks based on the uncertainty
introduced by dropout in neural networks. We show that our
defense is able to detect attacks created through optimized per-
turbations and frequency masking on a state-of-the-art end-to-
end ASR system. Furthermore, the defense can be made robust
against attacks that are immune to noise reduction. We test our
defense on Mozilla’s CommonVoice dataset, the UrbanSound
dataset, and an excerpt of the LibriSpeech dataset, showing that
it achieves high detection accuracy in a wide range of scenarios.
Index Terms: Automatic speech recognition, adversarial ma-
chine learning, audio attack, dropout, uncertainty distribution,
noise reduction
1. Introduction
An adversarial example is an input to a neural network designed
by an adversary to produce an incorrect or malicious output [1].
Early work on adversarial machine learning has shown that a
small and imperceptible optimized perturbation to an image can
cause misclassification by neural networks [2]. The field has
further expanded to tasks such as image segmentation [3], rein-
forcement learning [4], and reading comprehension [5].
More recently, there has been growing interest in creating
adversarial audio examples for automatic speech recognition
(ASR) systems. Carlini and Wagner [6] demonstrated that an
audio sample can be perturbed slightly to cause mistranscrip-
tion by an ASR engine. Building on this model, Qin et al. [7]
and Scho¨nherr et al. [8, 9] created nearly imperceptible audio
attacks by leveraging the principle of auditory masking [10].
There have also been attempts to create attacks embedded in
ultrasound frequencies [11] as well as phonetically constrained
attacks [12].
Adversarial machine learning exploits a vulnerability of
neural network models but also provides an avenue for mak-
ing models more robust and formulating defenses against such
attacks. There has been a significant effort in understanding
the underlying mechanism of adversarial attacks to formulate
effective defenses against attacks [13, 14], however such work
has largely focused on domains other than audio.
In this paper, we propose a defense against adversarial au-
dio attacks based on dropout. Dropout [15] is heavily used as
an effective regularizer for neural network training, particularly
in ASR systems. There have been successful attempts at using
dropout as a defense in the image domain [16]. We here inves-
tigate whether similar principles can be applied to ASR, where
varying sequence lengths pose an additional challenge.
This work was performed while T. Jayashankar was an intern and
P. Moulin on sabbatical at MERL.
2. End-to-end automatic speech recognition
Many recent ASR systems obtaining state-of-the-art results are
based on end-to-end architectures [17]. In contrast with conven-
tional hybrid ASR systems, which consist in multiple complex
modules such as acoustic, lexicon, and language models, end-
to-end systems typically use a single deep network trained to
directly map an input audio sample to a sequence of words or
characters, alleviating the need for expert knowledge to build
competitive systems.
The most popular end-to-end ASR approaches are connec-
tionist temporal classification (CTC) [18, 19], attention [20],
CTC/attention [21], RNN-T [22], and the Transformer [23, 24].
Since these models are differentiable, they can be trained with
backpropagation, which is appealing due to the ease with which
the model parameters can be updated by employing the chain
rule of differentiation. However, this can also be a weakness,
because an adversary may craft an adversarial input to fool a
model into producing a wrong or a malicious output by back-
propagating through it in order to minimize an error loss be-
tween the output of the model and the desired output.
In this paper, we focus on a CTC based architecture, as
implemented in Mozilla’s DeepSpeech system [19]. That sys-
tem has been used in past work on adversarial audio attacks [6]
and is publicly available, making it a convenient subject for our
study. However, the methods we detail can be applied to models
based on other end-to-end architectures as well.
3. Dropout
Dropout [15] is a regularization technique used to make neural
networks robust to different inputs. Dropout deactivates a cer-
tain number of neurons in a layer, i.e., the weights correspond-
ing to the neurons are set to zero. In each training iteration,
a layer with dropout rate p drops neurons uniformly at random
with probability p. During inference, dropout is typically turned
off, and the learned weight matrices are scaled by p so that the
expected value of an activation is the same as during training.
Intuitively, dropout enables the neural network to learn various
internal representations for the same input and output pair.
Adversaries typically exploit loopholes within a network by
crafting an input perturbation such that small finely-tuned dif-
ferences accumulate within the network to eventually result in a
malicious output. Since these adversarial attacks are often cre-
ated based on knowledge of the underlying architecture of the
model, we hope to disarm such attacks by perturbing that archi-
tecture via a random process like dropout.
4. Adversarial attacks on ASR systems
In this section, we present the various adversarial audio attacks
that we use in our experiments. We first introduce the Carlini
& Wagner attack (CW attack) as it forms the foundation for the
other attacks that we consider.
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4.1. Carlini & Wagner Attack
Given an original waveform x, Carlini and Wagner [6] propose
to construct a waveform x′ = x + δ such that x and x′ sound
nearly the same but are transcribed differently by an ASR en-
gine. The perturbation δ is optimized such that the perturbed
waveform x + δ is transcribed as a specific alternate (typically
malicious) target sentence t with the least distortion, by mini-
mizing a recognition loss function `(x+δ, t) (here, a CTC loss)
under the constraint that the peak energy of the perturbation be
at least τ dB smaller than that of the original waveform:
min
δ
`(x+ δ, t) s.t. dB(δ) ≤ dB(x)− τ, (1)
where dB(x) = 20maxi log(|xi|). Because ` is differentiable,
backpropagation is easily performed. During optimization, the
values of δ are limited to avoid clipping, and the threshold τ is
progressively decreased to strengthen the constraint.
4.2. Dropout Robust Attack
Adversarial examples generated by the CW attack are optimized
to be transcribed as certain target sentences at test time, with the
model in inference mode, and they are thus typically optimized
through the model with dropout turned off. A key insight is
that if inference is performed with dropout turned on, adversar-
ial examples tend to be transcribed as incorrect or garbled sen-
tences, and dropout may thus be used to detect them. But we
may consider a dropout robust (DR) attack including dropout
in the construction of the adversarial example, so that the opti-
mization procedure may have the chance to account for it. Since
the adversarial example should be transcribed as target sentence
t both with and without dropout turned on at inference time, the
loss in (1) is replaced by a multi-task loss formulated as
min
δ
`(x+δ, t)+β`pDR(x+δ, t) s.t. dB(δ)≤dB(x)− τ, (2)
where `pDR(x+ δ, t) is the same loss as ` except that dropout is
turned on with a rate pDR, and β is a weight (we used β = 1).
Dropout is applied to all layers except the LSTM layers.
4.3. Noise Reduction Robust (NRR) Attack
Many audio systems perform pre-processing steps involving de-
noising to clean the input audio signal. We observed that de-
noising was able to partially and often completely eliminate the
perturbation in the generated CW adversarial samples. Thus,
denoising can act in itself as an effective defense for the vanilla
CW attack.
To make the attack more robust, we trained the adversary
to transcribe as the target sentence t with and without a pre-
processing denoising stage by backpropagating through a spec-
tral subtraction algorithm [25], which was chosen for its sim-
plicity:
min
δ
`(x+δ, t)+β`ss(x+δ, t) s.t. dB(δ)≤dB(x)− τ, (3)
where `ss(x+ δ, t) is the same loss as ` except that the network
processes the perturbed input after spectral subtraction denois-
ing. Note that we also tried to make this attack robust to dropout
as in Section 4.2, but the optimization failed to converge in a
reasonable time, illustrating the difficulty to find a solution un-
der such constraints.
We did not experiment with neural network noise reduction
algorithms as these could themselves be susceptible to adver-
sarial attacks, through similar optimization procedures as dis-
cussed previously.
4.4. Imperceptible Audio Attack
Recently, Qin et al. [7] devised a new attack on ASR systems
based on frequency masking, the phenomenon whereby a softer
sound (the maskee) is rendered inaudible by a louder sound
(the masker) [10]. The vanilla CW attack is modified to en-
force that the power spectral density pδ of the perturbation in
the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) domain must fall be-
low the masking threshold θx of the original audio sample. The
complete optimization problem is formulated as
min
δ
`(x+ δ, t) + α
bN
2
c∑
k=0
max{pδ(k)− θx(k), 0}, (4)
where α controls the relative importance of the term making the
perturbation imperceptible, and N is the STFT window size.
After first optimizing with α = 0 to find a perturbed sample
transcribing as t, α is slowly increased to gradually satisfy the
imperceptibility constraint by fine-tuning the perturbation.
4.5. Urban Sound Attack
We also apply the vanilla CW attack to audio recordings of ev-
ery day noises such as construction sounds, cars honking, and
leaves rustling. The aim of this experiment is two-fold: 1) Can
the vanilla CW attack be applied to general sounds? 2) Can our
defense detect attacks concealed in such audio recordings?
4.6. Universal Perturbation Attack
Finally, we study adversarial examples generated by a model
based on universal adversarial perturbations [26]. A universal
perturbation is a single perturbation which when added to differ-
ent input audio samples causes a mistranscription by the ASR
engine. Unlike the perturbations considered so far, universal
perturbations are not targeted attacks, i.e., the transcription pro-
duced is not fixed. Moreover, in most cases, the transcription is
not a meaningful sentence.
5. Proposed Defense
5.1. Dropout defense in the image domain
Feinman et al. [16] showed that dropout can be used to build
an uncertainty estimator in neural networks for image classifi-
cation. Specifically, dropout in neural networks mimics a deep
Gaussian process and hence Bayesian estimates can be inferred.
In their experiments, they subject an input image to I realiza-
tions of dropout during inference. The intuition is that the real-
izations obtained from an adversarial example will show more
variation than those obtained from an original example. Let us
denote by y(x,W) ∈ RC the output probability vector of an
image classification network with parametersW for an input
image x, where C denotes the number of classes. Each real-
ization of dropout results in a new set of network parameters
W(i), i = 1, . . . , I . The output for realization i is denoted as
yi = y(x,W
(i)). (5)
The uncertainty U(x) of the network with respect to input x is
defined as the trace of the covariance matrix of the realizations,
or equivalently as the average Euclidean distance between the
realizations and their mean yˆ =
1
I
∑I
i=1 yi:
U(x) =
1
I
I∑
t=1
‖yi − yˆ‖2. (6)
A simple threshold-based classifier using the scalar U(x) as in-
put can now be designed to classify original and adversarial
samples, as the uncertainty of adversarial samples is expected
to be higher than that of original samples on average.
5.2. Extending the notion of uncertainty
Before we move to the audio domain, let us first introduce a
generalization to the notion of uncertainty used in Feinman et
al. [16], which will be useful later on. Instead of a single num-
ber, we would like to extract richer features for classification.
We assume we have a set {yi}Ii=1 of I points in some space
X , obtained as realizations of a neural network output with
dropout. We also assume that we have some function dmeasur-
ing a notion of distance between two points in X , as well as a
mechanism to obtain a point yˆ from the set {yi}Ii=1 encompass-
ing some notion of average with respect to these points. In the
image classification case above, the space X is the Euclidean
space RC , the function d is the squared Euclidean distance, and
yˆ is obtained as the mean of the points in {yi}Ii=1. Based on
these components, we can define the uncertainty distribution
P(z) =
∑
i
1{d(yˆ,yi)=z}, z ∈ R+, (7)
from which we can extract features to be used by a classifier.
For instance, in the image case, the uncertainty U(x) is none
other than the mean of P.
5.3. Designing a notion of uncertainty for ASR
The defense devised by Feinman cannot be directly applied to
the ASR case. Indeed, contrary to image classification where
the network output is a vector of class probability predictions
with fixed length, the corresponding output of an ASR system,
in the case of CTC, is a sequence of such posterior probabili-
ties, whose length depends on the input length. The problem is
even more complex for decoder-based models, where the length
of that sequence also depends on the internal processing of the
network, as the decoder determines itself the output length.
A direct extension of Feinman’s defense to the ASR case
could be to consider the sequence of CTC posterior probabili-
ties for an input x as a large vector used as the realization yi,
and to compute the uncertainty as in Eq. (6), normalizing by the
input length. We consider this our baseline defense. We can
further generalize this defense by considering the uncertainty
distribution Pprobx obtained using Eq. (7) in this context, and de-
riving features from it for a classifier.
For greater generalizability to various architectures and to
reduce the dependence on the audio input length, we consider
designing a defense based not on the sequence of CTC posterior
probabilities but on the final output character sequence, which
stems from all components of the network, including a potential
language model. The final character sequence length for a given
input may however vary depending on the internal processing
of the network. Transcriptions for different dropout realizations
may thus be of different lengths. Furthermore, while probability
vectors can be considered within a Euclidean space, allowing us
to define uncertainty based on the variance of their distribution,
this is not possible for character sequences.
To define an uncertainty distribution following Section 5.2,
we thus need to use a (non-Euclidean) distance metric d that
can be calculated between character sequences with potentially
different lengths. We use the Levenshtein distance, also known
as the edit distance, as d. Because there is no notion of average
in the non-Euclidean space X of character sequences with the
edit distance, we use the medoid of the I different output tran-
scriptions yi as our “mean” yˆ. The medoid yˆ of a set {yi}Ii=1
is defined as an element of the set whose average distance to all
other elements for a distance d is the smallest:
yˆ = argmin
y∈{y1,...,yI}
∑
i
d(y, yi). (8)
Now that all required notions have been defined, we can define
the uncertainty distribution Pcharx of an audio input x following
Eq. (7), where {y1, . . . , yI} are I character sequences output
by the ASR engine for different dropout realizations. Note that,
as the distances are integers, this distribution is a histogram.
5.4. Adversarial ASR Sample Classification
We can now classify an input audio sample x as adversarial
or not by using a binary classifier taking as input some fea-
tures derived from the distribution Pprobx or Pcharx . In our exper-
iments, we consider the following classifiers: a decision stump
trained on the mean of the distribution (DS), simply compar-
ing the mean to a threshold; a support vector machine (SVM)
trained on the first four moments of the distribution (SVM-4);
forPcharx , we also consider an SVM trained on the complete dis-
tribution (SVM-F), as we can obtain a fixed-length input vector
by considering (Pcharx (0), . . . ,Pcharx (C)), with C set to 19 (no
distances larger than 18 were observed on our data); as SVM-
F cannot be used for Pprobx , we replace it with a decision tree
trained on the first four moments of the distribution (DecTree).
We use a linear SVM in our experiments; other SVM variants
did not provide better results. Note that the DS classifier for
Pprobx corresponds to the most direct extension of Feinman et
al.’s defense to ASR, as mentioned in Section 5.3.
6. Experiments and Results
We implement our attacks and test our defenses on the Mozilla
DeepSpeech [19] ASR engine. DeepSpeech is based on a bi-
directional RNN network trained with CTC loss. The model’s
default dropout rate is ptr = 0.05 during training. The adver-
sarial samples are targeted to transcribe as “okay google unlock
phone and delete files”. In our defense, we use I =50 realiza-
tions of dropout to compute the uncertainty of an audio sample.
6.1. Choosing a Defense Dropout Rate
We first experimented with defense dropout rates p of 0.01 to
0.04 with increments of 0.01 to detect the CW attack samples.
There was no noticeable difference between the histograms of
the original and adversarial samples. However, we start noticing
significant differences for p=0.05 and above. Figure 1a shows
the mean uncertainty distribution Ex[Pcharx ] on all the original
training samples, and Fig. 1b that on all the CW adversarial
samples while using a defense dropout rate of 0.05 (CW p =
0.05). The corresponding defense accuracy results are shown
in the first column of Table 1.
As discussed in Section 4.2, an adversary may know the
dropout rate we use in our defense and try training through
dropout to break the defense. We observed that as the dropout
rate pDR used during adversarial training increases above the
default dropout rate ptr = 0.05, there is a sharp decrease in the
forgery success rate of the attack, i.e., the adversarial sample
did not get transcribed as the desired target sentence. An ad-
versary attempting to fool our defense by training through dif-
ferent dropout rates will have a very low forgery success rate
for pDR above 0.05 and an attack will be nearly impossible for
pDR = 0.1. Hence, we use a dropout rate p = 0.1 in our de-
(a) Original (b) CW, p=0.05 (c) CW, p=0.1 (d) DR, p=0.1
Figure 1: Mean empirical distributionEx[Pcharx ] of distances to medoid for original audio samples and adversarial audio samples from
different attacks. The mean distributions are computed by calculating the empirical mean of the distributions over all samples in the
training set. The defense dropout rate is denoted by p.
Table 1: Detection accuracy [%] of the various attacks using
different classifiers. p denotes the defense dropout rate.
p = 0.05 p = 0.1
CW CW DR NRR IA US
DS 71.7 83.3 62.5 94.7 91.0 90.4
Pprobx SVM-4 66.7 80.8 70.0 94.7 92.0 64.4
DecTree 65.0 80.8 64.2 84.2 87.0 91.8
DS 72.3 88.5 79.8 88.0 88.5 79.0
Pcharx SVM-4 76.7 91.5 84.5 90.5 91.5 85.0
SVM-F 74.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 83.0
fense for all future experiments, and pDR = 0.05 in training our
dropout robust attacks.
We trained all classifiers for defense against the CW and
DR attacks using a 70-30 train-test split on a subset of 400 sam-
ples of the CommonVoice dataset, where 200 randomly selected
original samples were used to generate 200 adversarial samples
using the corresponding attack. The average duration of each
audio sample is about 5 seconds. The new defense results with
higher defense dropout rate p = 0.1 for the CW and DR attacks
are shown in the second and third columns of Table 1. The un-
certainty distributions Ex[Pcharx ] for CW and DR with defense
dropout rate p = 0.1 are shown in Figs. 1c and 1d.
We see that using a defense dropout rate of 0.1 in con-
junction with an SVM trained on the first four moments of
the character-sequence-based uncertainty distribution (Pcharx -
SVM-4) led to the best results on the CW and DR attacks.
6.2. Defense Against Imperceptible and NRR Attacks
We observed that the noise reduction robust (NRR) attacks were
indeed robust to denoising techniques, and despite having been
optimized through a spectral subtraction algorithm, our adver-
sarial examples were also fairly robust to other noise reduction
algorithms such as the logmmse algorithm [27].
The imperceptible audio attack (IA) was originally im-
plemented to work with attention-based models. We re-
implemented the attack for the Mozilla DeepSpeech engine
with a few modifications. Specifically, the learning rate for the
initial α = 0 stage was decreased from 100 to 10, and the learn-
ing rate for the α > 0 stages was decreased from 1 to 0.1. Fur-
thermore, the loss function used is CTC loss instead of cross-
entropy loss. The imperceptible attacks are audibly sharper and
cleaner in comparison to the vanilla CW attack.
To evaluate their robustness, we use the classifiers trained
on the CW attack samples with p = 0.1 on these attacks. From
Table 1, we see that the defense results for the NRR and IA
attacks are similar to the results for CW for Pcharx . Note that
these attacks were not dropout robust, and the mean uncertainty
distributions of the adversarial samples are similar to that of CW
in Fig. 1c. This conveys that training through dropout has the
largest effect on the geometry of the uncertainty distributions.
We also implemented the IA attack on samples from the
LibriSpeech [28] dataset in order to investigate performance on
longer utterances than the CommonVoice dataset. Because the
utterances were longer, resulting in longer computation times in
order to create adversarial examples, we only evaluated a small
excerpt of 20 samples. Our defense was able to detect these
samples without error.
6.3. Defense Against Urban Sound Attack
We were able to successfully apply the vanilla CW attack to
the Urban Sound (US) [29] dataset. Unlike the previous results,
the mean distribution of the original samples did not resemble
Fig. 1a as the input was no longer speech, but the mean distri-
bution of the adversarial samples did resemble Fig. 1d despite
not being trained through dropout. The classifier was trained on
a similar dataset as that used to train the CW and DR defenses,
but based on the Urban Sound dataset instead of the Common-
Voice dataset. The defense results are shown in the last column
of Table 1.
6.4. Universal Perturbation
The universally perturbed audio attacks proposed in [26] do not
fall under our definition of an attack as the adversarial example
often does not transcribe as a meaningful sentence and hence
has no malicious nature. Nevertheless, our Pcharx - SVM-4 de-
fense trained on the CW attack data was able to classify the
examples provided on the authors’ website as adversarial with
100% accuracy.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that it is possible to extend
the vanilla CW attack to create adversarial examples robust to
dropout and denoising, and that such attacks can also be embed-
ded within everyday urban sounds. We have developed a de-
fense that can detect a wide range of attacks on ASR engines by
leveraging the uncertainty introduced by dropout. Using a sim-
ple binary classifier, we are able to detect adversarial examples
with high confidence. Particularly, training an SVM on the first
four moments of the distributions of distances between charac-
ter sequences realized with dropout and their medoid achieves
the best results. Furthermore, our defense is able to detect
adversarial examples trained with frequency masking and also
with a model based on universal perturbations.
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